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HUBBLE SERVICING CHALLENGES DRIVE INNOVATION OF  
SHUTTLE RENDEZVOUS TECHNIQUES* 
 
John∗L. Goodman†  
Stephen R. Walker‡  
 
 
Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing, performed by Space Shuttle crews, 
has contributed to what is arguably one of the most successful astronomy 
missions ever flown.  Both nominal and contingency proximity operations 
techniques were developed to enable successful servicing, while lowering the 
risk of damage to HST systems, and improve crew safety.  Influencing the 
development of these techniques were the challenges presented by plume 
impingement and HST performance anomalies.  The design of both the HST 
and the Space Shuttle was completed before the potential of HST 
contamination and structural damage by shuttle RCS jet plume impingement 
was fully understood.  Relative navigation during proximity operations has 
been challenging, as HST was not equipped with relative navigation aids.  
Since HST reached orbit in 1990, proximity operations design for servicing 
missions has evolved as insight into plume contamination and dynamic 
pressure has improved and new relative navigation tools have become 
available. Servicing missions have provided NASA with opportunities to gain 
insight into servicing mission design and development of nominal and 
contingency procedures.  The HST servicing experiences and lessons learned 
are applicable to other programs that perform on-orbit servicing and 
rendezvous, both human and robotic. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing performed by Space Shuttle crews has contributed to what is 
arguably one of the most successful astronomy missions ever flown.  On-orbit servicing performed by four 
Space Shuttle servicing missions between 1993 and 2002 has increased the science return and extended the 
life of the telescope by correcting performance problems, replacing malfunctioning hardware, and 
equipping it with more advanced astronomy sensors.1  A fifth servicing mission is planned for 2009.  
Servicing missions involve extensive coordination between specialists in multiple disciplines in both the 
Shuttle and HST Programs to develop new or adapt existing techniques for HST servicing.  These 
disciplines include trajectory design, robotics, flight control, thermal control, power generation, structures, 
orbital debris, and Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA).2 
 
HST servicing missions have provided NASA with opportunities to gain insight into servicing mission 
design and to develop nominal and contingency procedures.  HST performance issues have driven new and 
unanticipated servicing and proximity operations techniques development. Both nominal and contingency 
procedures and mission plans for rendezvous, proximity operations, jettison, deployment, and tool capture 
have evolved since HST was deployed on STS-31 in 1990.  Although Space Shuttle missions to HST 
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involve human-in-the-loop rendezvous, capture, and servicing, the HST servicing experiences and lessons 
learned are also applicable to current and future robotic flight programs that involve on-orbit servicing and 
rendezvous.3-8  The recent and highly successful Orbital Express robotic servicing demonstration mission 
illustrated the importance of pre-mission development of contingency procedures to address postulated 
anomalies, as well as real-time development of contingency procedures in response to unanticipated 
anomalies.9  Although HST EVA and robotic activities are outside the scope of this paper, those disciplines 
have likewise developed and evolved extensive nominal and contingency procedures. 
 
Servicing missions succeeded in part due to the efforts of experienced HST and Shuttle Program personnel 
(NASA and contractor) from multiple disciplines that had extensive experience planning and flying 
servicing and assembly missions to a variety of spacecraft.  This facilitated application of best practices and 
lessons learned.  These personnel were responsive to unanticipated satellite performance issues that drove 
late and significant changes in servicing mission plans.  These events drove changes to existing proximity 
operations, robotic operation, and servicing procedures or required the creation of new procedures and 
mission plans.  HST and Shuttle Program personnel continually learned about emerging HST and shuttle 
orbiter constraints.  Unforeseen constraints and performance limitations drove development of new or 
changes to existing nominal and contingency plans and procedures.  Rendezvous, proximity operations, and 
other mission techniques from other Space Shuttle missions were successfully applied to mitigate risk to 
HST servicing mission success. 
 
This paper provides an overview of HST servicing missions.  This is followed by a description of HST 
design and operations that are pertinent to Space Shuttle rendezvous and proximity operations.  Next, 
relative navigation and shuttle plume impingement challenges are discussed.  For the deploy mission and 
the servicing missions an overview is given of the rendezvous, proximity operations, and deploy 
procedures that were flown, along with mission results.  In addition, contingency procedures to address the 
HST aperture door failed closed or failed open cases are described.  Other contingency proximity 
operations and hardware jettison procedures are then outlined.  Finally, Table 1 is an overview of HST 
servicing mission objectives.  Table 2 is a list of nominal and contingency procedures for each mission that 
address relative motion.  The table lists procedures for rendezvous, proximity operations (approach and 
grapple), jettison, and deploy and separation. 
 
Finally, a rescue mission has been planned if a thermal protection system problem prevented the safe return 
of the STS-125 crew during the last HST servicing mission in 2009.  Since the rescue mission is different 
in many respects from the HST deployment and servicing missions, nominal and contingency procedures 
are discussed in a separate section at the end of the paper. 
 
OVERVIEW OF HST SERVICING MISSIONS 
 
Planning for all HST missions has involved trade studies, simulations, and extensive technical discussions 
covering both nominal and contingency mission plans and procedures.  Mission preparation includes 
timeline and crew activity planning, procedure development, and trajectory design covering all aspects of 
the mission.  This includes ascent, launch aborts, rendezvous, proximity operations, entry and landing, 
EVA, robotics, etc.  Contingency procedures are also developed or adapted to addresses systems anomalies 
that may occur in the rendezvous, proximity operations, servicing, and deploy phases. 
 
Shuttle rendezvous with HST and grapple, by the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) robotic arm, is 
normally scheduled for flight day three.∗∗  On the morning of flight day three, the shuttle relative navigation 
sensors (radar and star tracker) obtain relative measurements that are used to improve the estimate of the 
relative navigation state in the shuttle flight computers.  Rendezvous maneuvers are also computed by the 
shuttle flight computers. 
 
                                                 
∗∗ Flight day one begins with crew wakeup at the Kennedy Space Center on the day of launch.  Subsequent flight days on-orbit begin 
when the crew wakes up. 
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Once the orbiter is within approximately 2000 feet of HST the proximity operations phase begins.  The 
relative motion trajectory is designed to accommodate orbiter and HST constraints such as orbiter Reaction 
Control System (RCS) jet plume impingent, power generation, and thermal control.  The crew grapples 
HST with the RMS and berths it in the shuttle payload bay.  After several days of servicing by EVA crew 
members, HST is deployed and resumes the astronomy mission.  Deploy procedures are designed to ensure 
safe separation of the orbiter from HST while also concurrently protecting HST from plume impingement.  
Deploy procedures may also have to meet additional constraints for thermal, lighting, and communications.   
 
Mission
STS-61J
STS-31
STS-42
STS-61
STS-82
STS-103
STS-109
STS-125
STS-40x
Orbiter
Atlantis
OV-104
Discovery
OV-103
Discovery
OV-104 
Endeavour
OV-105
Discovery
OV-103
Discovery
OV-103
Columbia
OV-102
Atlantis
OV-104
?
HST Mission 
Objectives
Deploy HST
Deploy HST
Proposed HST
photo inspection.
Servicing  
Mission 1 (SM1)
Servicing 
Mission 2 (SM2)
Servicing 
Mission 3A (SM3A)
Servicing 
Mission 3B (SM3B)
Servicing 
Mission 4 (SM4)
Rescue 125 crew if 
required.
Launch Date, Pad
Landing Date, Runway
Mission planned for 
August, 1986.
4/24/90, 39B
4/29/90, EDW 22
01/22/92, 39A
01/ 30/92, EDW 22 
12/2/93, 39B
12/13/93, KSC 33
2/11/97, 39A
2/21/97, KSC 15
12/19/99, 39B
12/27/99, KSC 33
3/01/02, 39A
3/12/02, KSC 33
Mission planned for 
2009.
Mission planned for 
2009, if required.
TABLE 1
SPACE SHUTTLE MISSIONS CONCERNING THE HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE
EDW – Edwards Air Force Base
EURECA – European Retrievable Carrier 
EVA – Extra Vehicular Activity
MECO – Main Engine Cut-Off
OV – Orbiter Vehicle
RMS – Remote Manipulator System
SM – Servicing Mission
STS – Space Transportation System
TCS – Trajectory Control Sensor
HST – Hubble Space Telescope
KSC – Kennedy Space Center
LIDS – Low Impact Docking System
Remarks
Canceled after Challenger accident.
HST successfully deployed.  Contingency rendezvous with HST planned 
but not required.
Proposed inspection was to document solar array tip deflections that 
could lead to array failure and negatively impact astronomy.  Inspection 
proposal rejected in August 1991. Primary mission objective International 
Microgravity Laboratory-1.
Installation of corrective optics.  Solar arrays replaced and one old array 
jettisoned by EVA crew. 
MECO under-speed.  During rendezvous star tracker broke lock on HST, 
then tracked a star and orbital debris.  SEP2 maneuver under-burn.  Re-
planning and crew procedures executed in response to these issues 
ensured successful rendezvous and separation.
Flown in response to HST gyro failures.  HST in Hardware Sun Point 
safe mode at the time of rendezvous due to fourth gyro failure. 
Discovery yaw maneuver due to off nominal HST attitude at the time 
of grapple.
Rendezvous altitude decayed below insertion altitude, forcing one 
rendezvous maneuver to be retrograde.
Mount passive LIDS docking hardware and laser retro-reflectors on HST 
for possible missions by future human or robotic spacecraft. 
Rescue orbiter grapples Atlantis with RMS.  EVA transfer of Atlantis crew 
to rescue orbiter.  TCS retro-reflector mounted in Atlantis payload bay for 
use by rescue orbiter TCS.
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EVA – Extra Vehicular Activity
FRCS – Forward Reaction Control System
GF – Grapple Fixture
HST – Hubble Space Telescope
ORBT – Optimized R Bar Targeted Rendezvous
Mission
STS-31
Nominal
Contingency
STS-61
Nominal
Contingency
STS-82
Nominal
Contingency
STS-103
Nominal
Contingency
STS-109
Nominal
Contingency
STS-125
Nominal
Contingency
STS-401
Nominal
Contingency
Rendezvous
• Stable Orbit (2 rev)
• Radar Fail 
• Rndz Breakout 
• Ti Delay 
• Stable Orbit (2 rev)
• Radar Fail 
• Rndz Breakout 
• Ti Delay 
• Stable Orbit (2 rev)
• Radar Fail 
• Rndz Breakout 
• Ti Delay 
• ORBT (2 rev)
• Stable Orbit (2 rev)
• Radar Fail 
• Rndz Breakout 
• Ti Delay 
• ORBT (1 rev)
• Stable Orbit (1 rev)
• Radar Fail 
• Rndz Breakout 
• Ti Delay 
• ORBT (1 rev)
• Stable Orbit (1 rev)
• Radar Fail 
• Rndz Breakout 
• Ti Delay 
• ORBT (1 rev)
• Radar Fail 
• Rndz Breakout 
• Ti Delay 
Proximity Operations
• Inertial Approach 
• Fast Flyaround
• STS Roll to Align 
• Inertial Approach
• Manual Inertial Flyaround
Alignment Trim 
• AUTO Inertial Flyaround
• Prox Ops Backoff
• Prox Ops Breakout 
• +R Bar Approach/Inertial Grapple
• Inertial Approach 
• RBAR Yaw Alignment 
• Manual Inertial Flyaround
Alignment Trim 
• AUTO Inertial Flyaround
• Prox Ops Backoff
• +R Bar Approach/Inertial Grapple
• Inertial Approach 
• RBAR Yaw Alignment 
• Manual Inertial Flyaround
Alignment Trim 
• AUTO Inertial Flyaround
• Prox Ops Backoff
• HST R Bar Breakout 
• +R Bar Approach/Inertial Grapple
• Inertial Approach 
• RBAR Yaw Alignment 
• Manual Inertial Flyaround
Alignment Trim 
• AUTO Inertial Flyaround
• Prox Ops Backoff
• HST R Bar Breakout 
• +R Bar Approach/Inertial Grapple
• Inertial Approach 
• RBAR Yaw Alignment 
• Manual Inertial Flyaround
Alignment Trim 
• AUTO Inertial Flyaround
• Prox Ops Backoff
• HST R Bar Breakout 
• +R Bar Approach
• Prox Ops Backoff
• HST R Bar Breakout
Jettison
• HST Jettison 
• SAC Jettison 
• ORUC Jettison 
• SA Jettison Using 
Jettison Handle 
• SA Jettison Using 
Portable GF 
• HST Jettison
• EVA Hardware Jettison 
• HST Jettison for 
Rapid Safing
• ORUC Jettison 
• EVA Hardware Jettison 
• HST Solar Array Jettison 
• HST Jettison for Rapid 
Safing
• SAC Jettison 
• RAC Jettison
• EVA Hardware/Solar 
Array Jettison
• HST Jettison for Rapid 
Safing
• SLIC Jettison 
• ORUC Jettison 
• EVA Hardware Jettison 
Deploy/Separation
• Deploy with RMS
• Emergency RMS 
Deploy 
• No RMS Backaway
Deploy
• Deploy with RMS
• RMS Quick Deploy
• No RMS Backaway
Deploy 
• Low Propellant Sep
(flown on STS-61) 
• Deploy with RMS
• RMS Quick Deploy
• No RMS Backaway
Deploy 
• No FRCS Sep 
• Deploy with RMS
• RMS Quick Deploy
• No RMS Backaway
Deploy 
• Deploy with RMS
• RMS Quick Deploy
• No RMS Backaway
Deploy 
• Deploy with RMS
• RMS Quick Deploy
• No RMS Backaway
Deploy 
• Separation
• Prox Ops Breakout 
• EVA Rescue 
• Loss of VRCS 
• Tool chasing 
• EVA Rescue 
• Loss of VRCS 
• Prox Ops Breakout 
• Loss of Low Z Braking 
• Loss of Low Z Breakout 
• Loss of VRCS 
• Tool chasing  
• EVA Rescue 
• HST Flyaround/Loss of 
LOW Z Breakout 
• Loss of VRCS 
• Loss of Low Z Braking 
• Tool Chasing  
• EVA Rescue  
• HST Flyaround/Loss of 
LOW Z Breakout 
• Loss of VRCS 
• Loss of Low Z Braking 
• Tool Chasing  
• EVA Rescue  
• HST Flyaround/Loss of 
Low Z Breakout 
• Loss of VRCS 
• Loss of Low Z Braking 
• Tool Chasing  
• EVA Rescue 
• Loss of VRCS
TABLE 2
NOMINAL AND CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES FOR HST SERVICING MISSIONS
ORUC – Orbital Replacement Unit Carrier
RAC – Rigid Array Carrier
RMS – Remote Manipulator System
Rndz – Rendezvous
SA – Solar Array
SAC – Solar Array Carrier
SLIC – Super Lightweight Interchangeable Carrier 
STS – Space Transportation System
Ti – Transition Initiation
VRCS – Vernier Reaction Control System  
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THE HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE  
 
Figure 1 is an illustration of the HST as it appears on-orbit 
while conducting the astronomy mission.  Two solar arrays 
provide electrical power.  HST attitude and solar array 
orientation must be carefully managed to ensure that 
sufficient power is available to recharge HST batteries.  In 
addition, the HST solar arrays, solar array support structure, 
and rotational mechanisms are sensitive to shuttle RCS jet 
plume contamination and over-pressure.  Significant analysis 
is required to develop nominal and contingency proximity 
operations procedures (approach, grapple, deploy) that do not 
violate HST plume constraints.  Furthermore, HST attitude 
during shuttle proximity operations must be carefully 
managed to ensure that the HST solar arrays can generate 
sufficient power, even in the presence of degraded HST 
attitude control system performance.  HST optics are sensitive 
to plume contamination as well.  However, the optics are 
protected by closing the aperture door during the approach by 
the shuttle. 
 
HST relies on four Reaction Wheel Assemblies (RWAs) for attitude control, rather than using RCS jets.  
Six Rate Gyro Assemblies (RGAs) provide redundant measurements for attitude control.  However, only 
three RGAs are required for attitude control.  The Retrieval Mode Gyro Assembly (RMGA) is a non-
redundant set of back-up gyros that are independent of the RGAs.  The RMGA can provide course attitude 
data for limited periods to support shuttle proximity operations and grapple. 
 
In the event of performance anomalies HST has two attitude control safe modes to maintain HST in a 
power positive configuration.  A HST systems anomaly that forces use of one of the safe modes has 
implications for proximity operations and shuttle robotics procedures.  The Hardware Sunpoint Safe Mode 
uses RMGA data and points the +V3 axis to the Sun, maintains an inertial attitude hold, aligns the solar 
arrays with the V1 axis, and closes the aperture door.  The Zero Gyro Sunpoint Safe Mode (ZGSP) points 
the +V3 axis in the general direction of the Sun, maintains a slow spin about the V3 axis, aligns the solar 
arrays with the V1 axis, and closes the aperture door.  Coarse rate and Sun position data is obtained from 
the Coarse Sun Sensor.  No RGA data is used by the ZGSP safe mode. 
 
Before the shuttle begins the final approach to grapple HST with the RMS, the HST is placed in a proper 
systems configuration and attitude.  The –V3 HGA (Figure 1) is stowed and latched, and the solar arrays 
rotated to be parallel with the V1 axis.  HST performs a roll maneuver to place the RMS grapple fixture on 
the north side of the orbital plane. HST continues to maintain an inertial attitude hold during rendezvous 
and final approach. Two RMS grapple fixtures are mounted on the HST along the –V3 axis (Figure 1).  The 
fixtures can be removed and installed by EVA crew, if required.  The nominal grapple attitude of HST is 
not optimal for power generation by the solar arrays.  When the roll maneuver completes, a 180 minute Sun 
pointing timer is started.  If HST is not grappled by the orbiter after 180 minutes, HST performs a low rate 
attitude maneuver to a power optimal attitude.  However, this maneuver has not been required on the 
missions flown.   
 
PROPULSION, ATTITUDE CONTROL, AND PLUME IMPINGEMENT CHALLENGES 
 
The early operational concepts for HST defined in the 1970s included on-orbit servicing by astronauts.  
HST hardware and systems layout was designed to support servicing.  However, the design of both the 
HST and the Space Shuttle was completed before the potential of HST contamination or structural damage, 
resulting from over-pressure by shuttle RCS jet plume impingement, was fully understood.  As a result, 
proximity operations design for servicing missions has evolved as insight into plume effects on HST has 
Figure 1  Hubble Space Telescope
Solar 
Array
Solar 
Array
Open 
Aperture 
Door
High 
Gain 
Antenna
High 
Gain 
Antenna+V3
+V1+V2
HST Coordinates
RMS Grapple 
Fixtures 
(Not Visible)
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improved.  To minimize risk of plume contamination and 
over-pressure the shuttle Low Z flight control mode is used 
for HST and other proximity operations missions, such as 
Mir and ISS, rather than normal Z axis firings (Figure 2).  
The Low Z mode provides some RCS braking capability 
while minimizing RCS plume impingement.  The Low Z 
mode uses X body axis jets that have a small thrust 
component along the Z axis, rather than Z axis jets that 
direct plumes at the target spacecraft.  The X-axis thrust 
components of the forward and aft-firing jets sum to near-
zero, leaving a small Z-axis component that can be used for 
braking. Propellant consumption for braking is increased 
dramatically in the Low Z mode.  The Z axis thrust 
component of the X axis jets was not an original Space 
Shuttle design requirement for proximity operations.  The 
Low Z mode was developed in 1977-1978 time period, after 
the shuttle design was finalized and hardware was already 
under construction.  However, use of the Low Z mode 
increases propellant consumption on missions that are 
already propellant limited as the HST orbital altitude is 
much higher than the orbital altitude of other shuttle missions. 
 
HST does not have a propulsion system for orbit maintenance or attitude control.  Consequently it is 
dependent on the shuttle for orbit raising maneuvers to counteract orbital decay due to atmospheric drag.  
While the HST is in the shuttle payload bay the shuttle performs a re-boost maneuver to increase the HST 
orbital altitude.  Since years separate servicing missions, HST is placed and maintained at as high an 
altitude as can be reached by the shuttle.  The orbital altitude coupled with the previously mentioned 
extensive use of the Low Z flight control mode reduces available propellant margins.   
 
STS-31 – HST DEPLOY 
 
After a four year delay due to the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger, HST was deployed from the orbiter 
Discovery on April 25, 1990 (flight day two), during the STS-31 mission (Table 1).   
 
STS-31 Deploy  
 
After HST was unberthed from the payload bay 
with the RMS, solar array #2 did not unfurl.  In the 
event that an EVA was required to manually unfurl 
the array, two EVA crew members conducted the 
in-suit pre-breath activity (to reduce the time 
required to flush nitrogen from the bloodstream 
while in the airlock), and then entered the shuttle 
airlock.  The airlock was then depressurized to 5 
psi.  However, another pre-planned contingency 
procedure successfully unfurled the array on the 
third attempt and the EVA was not required.  Solar 
array #1 and the two HGAs were deployed without 
incident before HST was released from the RMS 
on revolution 20 (Figure 3). 
 
The shuttle rendezvous radar tracked HST from a range of 96 feet to 38,000 feet, when the Ku antenna was 
taken to the communications mode.  Rendezvous radar data was incorporated into on-board navigation 
during the separation to improve crew and Mission Control knowledge of relative motion (Figure 4).  Use 
Figure 2  Normal and Low Z 
Primary RCS jet plumes.
Low Z
Normal
-Z
+X
Approach 
Direction
Body
Axes
Figure 3  STS-31 HST Deployment
°°
Sun
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of the rendezvous radar provided a more accurate relative state solution than could have been obtained with 
ground radar and Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TRDSS) tracking. 
Figure 4  STS-31 HST Deploy Profile
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tracking.
5. Maneuver to Sep2 
burn attitude.
6. Coast in LVLH 
attitude hold. 7. Sep2 burn.
8. Maneuver to HST 
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Figure 5  STS-31 separation, long range station-
keeping, and coelliptic departure profile.  
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The Separation 1 (SEP1) maneuver was performed with the RCS in the Low Z mode to minimize HST 
contamination by RCS plumes.  Separation maneuvers performed by Discovery were required to prevent 
recontact with HST and ensure that the safe separation continued during the crew sleep period following 
HST deployment (Figure 5).  The HST inertial deployment was designed to ensure that HST sun sensors 
would lock onto the Sun after release from the RMS.  The time required for HST to acquire and track the 
Sun to minimize battery discharge and recovery time was also considered. 
 
Continuous communications with Discovery was required for pre-defined periods before and after 
deployment.  Once HST was released and Discovery separated to a safe distance, HST mission 
responsibility was transferred to the HST Director of Orbit Verification at the Space Telescope Operations 
Control Center (STOCC) at the Goddard Space Flight Center.  After HST deploy, Discovery separated 
overnight and conducted long-range station-keeping in the general vicinity of a position 40 nm behind HST 
on the –V Bar (Figure 5).  The Shuttle Program was required to maintain a capability to rendezvous with 
HST for up to 45 hours or until the STOCC verified that the aperture door was open.  Long range station-
keeping was conducted until HST activation was complete and the aperture door successfully opened by 
the STOCC.  At approximately 1 day and 19 hours after deployment Discovery was released from HST 
operations.  A contingency rendezvous was not required.  Discovery left the long-range station-keeping 
trajectory using an orbit coelliptic to HST to ensure safe separation (Figure 5). 
 
STS-31 Contingency Rendezvous and Inertial Approach 
 
While rendezvous was part of the nominal mission plan for future servicing missions, it was a contingency 
procedure for STS-31.  The only driver, for a contingency rendezvous following deploy, was to open a 
failed closed HST aperture door (Figure 1).  The contingency rendezvous timeline was written for a flight 
day 5 rendezvous and EVA by the crew to open the door, with an additional flight day added to the mission 
(Figure 6).  However, HST would have been released 
even if it was known that an existing orbiter systems 
problem would prevent a contingency rendezvous from 
being performed.  An orbiter systems problem could 
require the orbiter to return to Earth sooner than 
planned.  In this case a Minimum Duration Flight 
(MDF) could be declared, with the orbiter returning to 
Earth as soon as 72 hours after launch.  The MDF 
mission timeline could not have supported a 
contingency rendezvous and EVA to open the failed 
closed aperture door.  
Figure 6  Stable orbit rendezvous profile for 
STS-31 (contingency) and STS-61 and STS-82 
(both nominal).  
•
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The contingency rendezvous profile was the standard stable orbit profile (Figure 6) with an inertial 
approach (Figure 7).10  If a rendezvous and grapple were required, mission responsibility would revert from 
the STOCC to the Mission Control flight director in Houston.  At sunrise, on the grapple orbit, HST would 
be maneuvered so that the –V1 axis would be pointed into the velocity vector at orbital noon.  At this time 
the –V1 axis would also be pointed at the payload bay of the approaching Discovery when it arrived on the 
+V bar.  At orbital noon HST would then roll about the V1 axis so that the –V3 RMS grapple fixture would 
be pointed in a specified direction out-of-plane and on the north side of the orbit (Figure 8).  After the roll 
maneuver was complete Discovery would approach to within 200 feet and the RCS system would be placed 
in the Low Z mode (Figure 2).  This HST maneuver sequence was designed to align the HST for capture 
with the RMS of Discovery and to reduce or eliminate the need for Discovery to perform additional 
maneuvers to prepare for capture. 
 
Figure 8  Nominal HST attitude as 
seen from the orbiter at grapple.
Aperture door end of HST is 
pointed away from the orbiter.
Orbital Plane
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Figure 7  Inertial proximity operations approach 
for STS-31 (contingency) and STS-61 (nominal).
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STS-61 – SERVICING MISSION 1 (SM1) 
 
On June 25, 1990, two months to the day after deployment from Discovery, a spherical aberration was 
discovered in Hubble's primary mirror, significantly reducing the quality of astronomical observations.  A 
major objective of the first servicing mission was to install the Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial 
Replacement, or COSTAR.  Five corrective mirrors in COSTAR corrected the optical effects of the flawed 
mirror.  Additional upgrades made by the EVA crew included the Wide Field Planetary Camera 2 
(WFPC2) to replace WFPC1, new solar arrays and solar array drive electronics, new magnetometers, new 
coprocessors for the flight computer, two new Rate Sensor Units, two new Gyroscope Electronic Control 
Units, and a Goddard High Resolution Spectrometer redundancy kit.  The new solar arrays reduced the 
vibration caused by array motion as HST moved from orbital night to day. 
 
STS-61 Rendezvous and Proximity Operations  
 
HST was successfully maneuvered to the rendezvous attitude and the aperture door closed on flight day 2.   
The nominal rendezvous was designed with HST grapple on flight day 3.  The on-board targeted phase 
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profile on the day of rendezvous was the standard stable orbit profile (Figure 6) that was also carried as a 
contingency for STS-31.  The crew sighted HST near the start of the first star tracker pass (Figure 6).  Two 
star tracker passes were performed before the first on-board targeted maneuver, Corrective Combination 
(NCC).††  Radar data was incorporated after NCC.  The Transition Initiation (Ti) maneuver targeted the 
orbiter for a HST intercept.  Following Mid-course Correction 4 (MC4) the crew began the proximity 
operations phase and near-continuous manual trajectory control.   
 
After the orbiter Ti maneuver, HST was configured by the STOCC to reduce the electrical power required, 
in order to accommodate the HST roll to grapple attitude during proximity operations.  At the start of the 
terminal phase (post MC4), the HST +V3 axis pointed at the sun.  The solar arrays were aligned with the 
V1 axis and the –V3 HGA was stowed to maximize clearance for the RMS grapple.  However, HST could 
have been grappled and berthed with the HGA deployed, if required.  Approximately 20 minutes before the 
orbiter reached the +V Bar, HST began a roll maneuver to place the RMS grapple fixture on the north side 
of the orbital plane (Figure 8).   
 
At a range of 400 feet the crew transitioned the flight control system to the Low Z mode to avoid plume 
over-pressure on the HST solar arrays (Figures 2 and 7).  Increased fidelity plume impingement analysis 
resulted in a procedural change to place the flight control system in the Low Z mode at a range of 400 feet, 
rather than 200 feet as had been called out in the STS-31 contingency rendezvous procedures.  This change 
was made to avoid structural damage to the HST solar array bi-stems. 
 
The HST roll maneuver was completed by the time the orbiter arrived on the +V Bar, at orbital noon, at a 
range of approximately 350 feet (Figure 7).  At this time the HST –V1 axis (end of HST opposite the 
aperture door) was aligned with the +V Bar and pointing at the orbiter (Figure 8).  The crew continued the 
inertial approach until reaching the station-keeping range of 35 feet.  The grapple was successful, and was 
scheduled to occur 10 minutes after orbital sunset to minimize shuttle camera blooming and permit 
completion of photography of solar array deflection during sunset.   
 
During the flight, considerable work was done on possible changes to the solar array jettison procedure to 
account for the possibility of having to jettison one jammed solar array while the other fragile array was 
also stuck in a deployed state (Table 2). One of the original solar arrays did not retract when commanded, 
and was subsequently jettisoned by an EVA crew member attached to the end of the RMS.  The other array 
was returned to Earth.  After jettison, rotational and translational motion imparted to the solar array by 
shuttle RCS jet plume impingement was clearly visible to the crew and Mission Control personnel.  Some 
personnel commented that the flapping motion of the array appeared to be like a prehistoric pterodactyl.  It 
was estimated that 3 feet/second of delta-velocity was imparted to the arrays by RCS jet firings based on 
radar ground tracking and on-board laser measurements.  Solar array motion heightened concerns about 
plume impingement on HST.  The new solar arrays were installed and deployed successfully.  However, 
the new arrays had a noticeable twist that contributed to increased plume impingement concerns on later 
missions.  Additional work during the flight focused on 
changes to the tool chasing procedure, and a separation 
procedure that used the normal Z RCS jets (Figure 2).   
 
STS-61 Deploy  
 
Before HST deploy the shuttle performed a re-boost, 
circularizing the HST orbit at 321 nm.  Starting with 
STS-61, the aperture door was opened before HST was 
deployed from the shuttle (Figure 9).  If the door failed 
to open, the crew could perform an EVA with HST 
                                                 
†† “N” originally (pre 1965) was the number of the crossing of the chaser line of apsides where the maneuver was performed (as in 1 
for first apogee, 1.5 for first perigee, 5 for fifth apogee, etc.).  The number is no longer assigned to the burn names NC (catch-up or 
phasing), NH (height), NPC (plane change), NSR (slow rate or coelliptic), and NCC (corrective combination). 
 
Figure 9  HST deployment for STS-61 and 
subsequent missions.  Note open door.
Sun
+V3
+V2
+V1
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berthed in the payload bay to manually open the door.  Unlike STS-31, no contingency re-rendezvous for 
the crew to manually open the aperture door during an EVA was planned for STS-61 or subsequent 
servicing missions.  However, this did not preclude one from being performed, if required.  The HST 
deploy and separation sequence was designed to be flexible to preserve a re-rendezvous capability.   
 
The nominal separation sequence provided safe 
post-deploy relative motion and minimized 
plume impingement, contamination, and 
propellant consumption (Figure 10).  Nominal 
HST deploy was designed to occur at least 20 
minutes before sunset.  Ground 
communications with HST was required from 
before the opening of the deploy window to 
after deploy.  Both HGAs were deployed 
before HST release from the RMS, with the 
solar arrays aligned with the V1 axis and the 
+V3 axis pointed at the sun.  This deploy 
attitude was optimal for power generation.   An 
alternate separation sequence was developed 
late in the mission planning process that 
required less propellant, but it had a shorter 
deploy window.  HST was successfully re-
deployed and the alternate separation sequence 
was flown.  
 
STS-82 – SERVICING MISSION 2 (SM2) 
 
Two new science instruments were added to HST during the second servicing mission (Table 1).  These 
were the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph and the Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object 
Spectrometer.  Hardware replacements included a refurbished Fine Guidance Sensor, a new Solid State 
Recorder, one new Reaction Wheel Assembly to replace one of the four original units, and the addition of 
an Optical Control Electronics Enhancement kit.  Other maintenance items included replacement of one of 
the four Data Interface Units and replacement of one of the two Solar Array Drive Electronics units. 
 
STS-82 Rendezvous and Proximity Operations 
 
At the end of powered ascent, a 6.1 ft/sec Main Engine Cut-Off (MECO) under-speed occurred.  This 
resulted in the re-planning by Mission Control of two burns on the day of rendezvous, before on-board 
sensor tracking started (Figure 6).  Similar MECO under-speeds were seen on other HST servicing 
missions as well.  While the under-speeds were within the design margins of the shuttle, mission planning 
for the later STS-125 and Atlantis rescue mission was performed to minimize MECO under-speed and 
subsequent rendezvous burn impacts. 
 
The rendezvous profile flown by STS-82 was the same stable orbit profile flown by STS-61 (Figure 6).    
During the first star tracker pass, the star tracker lost lock on a dim HST and began tracking what was later 
determined to be the star Saiph.  The relative navigation filter in the shuttle computer rejected two star 
tracker measurements and then momentarily re-established lock on a slightly brighter HST.  Lock on HST 
was lost again and the star tracker acquired what was apparently nearby orbital debris.  The navigation state 
was corrupted by three navigation updates during the debris tracking period.  A crew command to inhibit 
navigation processing was not accepted by the shuttle computer due to a known timing issue.  The star 
tracker re-acquired HST and subsequent measurements corrected the error introduced by the spurious 
measurements.  The crew replaced the state vector that had received spurious updates with a backup vector.  
The star tracker pass continued without incident.  Post flight analysis indicated that the HST solar arrays 
were parallel to the star tracker’s line-of-sight and pointed to the Sun.  The end of the HST (the V1 axis, 
Figure 10  Nominal and Alternate STS-61 HST 
Deploy Profiles.
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Figure 1) was pointed to the orbiter.  This combination of HST attitude with the sun 90 degrees from the 
star tracker line-of-sight resulted in a dim target, causing the star tracker to lose lock on HST. 
 
After the first star tracker pass, an additional unplanned out-of-plane correction maneuver was performed 
based on ground radar tracking data and the results of the first star tracker pass (Figure 6).  Out-of-plane 
corrections during the rest of the rendezvous were minor.  The remaining rendezvous and grapple activities 
were nominal. 
 
While the rendezvous profiles for STS-61 and STS-82 were the same, STS-82 flew a different final 
approach during proximity operations.  Just after MC4 the crew transitioned from the inertial approach to a 
lower energy +R Bar approach (Figure 11).  The +R Bar approach (Figure 12) was developed for the 
shuttle missions to Mir and the ISS in 1994.  It was first flown on STS-66 (November 1994) during the 
rendezvous with and retrieval of the CRISTA-SPAS deployed payload.10   
 
Figure 12  Final +R Bar Approach 
and Inertial Grapple
100 foot station-keeping
to wait for HST alignment.
When aligned inertial 
approach begins.
+50
+100
+150
+200
+250
+300
+350
+100 -100-50
Station-keeping at 35 feet
and inertial grapple.
+R
 B
ar
 (f
ee
t)
+V Bar (feet)
Figure 11  STS-82 +R Bar approach 
from stable orbit profile.
+ 
R
 B
ar
 (f
ee
t)
Manual Phase
Takeover 
(MC4 + 2 min)
+ V Bar (feet)
+400
+800
+1200
+1600
+2000
+2400
+2800
+400 -400
+R Bar
Crossing
1500 Feet
Start Low Z
Stabilize 
on + R Bar
Inertial 
Grapple
+R Bar
Approach
+R
 B
ar
 (f
ee
t)
+R
 B
ar
 (f
ee
t)
+R
 B
ar
 (f
ee
t)
+ 
R
 B
ar
 (f
ee
t)
+ 
R
 B
ar
 (f
ee
t)
 
The primary advantage of the new approach was natural orbital 
mechanics braking.  This reduced the risk of plume impingement 
as fewer RCS jet firings were required. The natural orbital 
mechanics braking allowed the HST Low Z range constraint to 
be increased to 1500 ft to provide additional plume protection as 
the HST slowly rotated above the approaching shuttle.   A +R 
Bar approach also provided a hands-off separation, that required 
no RCS jet firings due to orbital mechanics.  Once the range to 
HST was less than 150 feet, the crew would station-keep on the 
+R Bar and wait for the HST –V1 axis to align with the orbiter –
Z axis (Figures 12 and 13).  Once the axes were aligned, the 
crew would establish an inertial attitude hold and perform an 
inertial approach to the 35 foot station-keeping range for RMS 
grapple of HST.  
Figure 13  Bird’s eye view of HST 
in nominal grapple attitude for 
the +R Bar approach.
+H Bar
Orbit
Plane
+V2
+V3
+R Bar into 
the page
+V Bar
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STS-82 Contingency Inertial Approach 
 
If the aperture door failed to close before rendezvous, the unprotected HST optics could be pointed at an 
orbiter performing a +R Bar approach (Figure 12).  This would result in unacceptable contamination of the 
HST optical system.  To protect for the aperture door failed open case an inertial proximity operations 
approach, like that flown on STS-61, would have been performed (Figure 7).  During an inertial approach 
the open aperture door would be pointed away from the approaching orbiter during proximity operations. 
The inertial approach, however, meant increased propellant consumption.  For STS-82, the inertial 
approach procedures were not part of the rendezvous procedures book flown on the orbiter, but they would 
have been uplinked to the crew, if required.   
 
STS-82 Nominal Deploy 
 
STS-82 included a new deploy requirement as ultraviolet light reflected off of the Earth might enter the 
telescope when the aperture door was open.  The ultraviolet light could cause any contamination that might 
accumulate on the mirror during the servicing mission to permanently adhere to the mirror.  The STS-82 
deploy procedure had the same RMS position as on STS-61, but a new Orbiter attitude.  The new 
requirement was to point the HST +V1 axis away from the bright Earth limb.  HST was to be released in 
daylight before sunset to allow adequate HST sun sensor acquisition time.  The release attitude pointed the 
+V3 axis pointed at the sun.  Both HGAs were deployed.  The overall deploy procedures minimized plume 
impingement, contamination, and propellant use.  Deploy design also ensured shuttle crew and ground 
communication with HST before and after release.   
 
Two deploy and separation profiles were prepared for the mission (Figures 14 and 15).  The appropriate 
profile was chosen based on the side of the orbital plane where the Sun was located.  The initial HST 
separation burn was changed based on experience from procedures developed for deployments of 
spacecraft equipped with a solid rocket motor, such as the Inertial Upper Stage.  The first separation burn 
was performed with two forward firing –X RCS jets in free drift.  As this burn moved the orbiter away 
from the HST, the +Z thrust component of the forward jets caused the orbiter to pitch nose-down until 
commanded to stop a short while later.  This rotation provided adequate clearance to the cabin while 
keeping HST visible to the crew over the payload bay.  The –X jet separation also used less propellant and 
had a lower risk of plume impingement than a Low Z separation.   
 
Figure 14  Nominal HST deploy profile for 
Sun north of the orbital plane, missions 
82, 103, 109, and 125.
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HST re-deploy was nominal.  However, the second burn in the two burn separation sequence was under-
burned (Figure 14).   While the post-burn relative motion placed Discovery on a safe departure trajectory, 
the separation rate was less then desired.  In addition, cross-coupling, of RCS attitude control firings into 
translational motion, threatened to further decrease the separation rate of Discovery.   A third separation 
burn was computed by Mission Control.  Burn data was voiced to the crew and the burn was executed.  
Post-flight analysis indicated that the under-burn was due to the high rate of Translational Hand Controller 
(THC) deflection.  A restriction on the THC deflection rate was known at one time, but the constraint had 
not been included in the crew procedure.  The procedure was later modified for later flights to replace large 
numbers of pulses with a single continuous THC deflection, and crew training was improved to increase 
awareness of the deflection rate limit. 
 
STS-103 – SERVICING MISSION 3A (SM3A) 
 
The third servicing mission (SM3) was originally planned for June of 2000.  However, in February of 1999 
a third gyroscope failure occurred.  While HST was capable of supporting science activities with no fewer 
than three gyroscopes, NASA decided to re-schedule the third repair mission to fly before the end of 1999 
and replace the failed gyroscopes.  Some hardware originally scheduled for the original SM3 mission in 
2000 was not ready to support a flight in 1999.  As a result, SM3 was split into two missions, SM3A (STS-
103) and SM3B (STS-109).  Replacement hardware, not available to support the 1999 SM3A mission, was 
redirected to the newly defined SM3B (STS-109) mission that was later flown in March of 2002.   
 
SM3A servicing objectives included replacement of all six gyroscopes, a new computer, replacement of 
one of three Fine Guidance Sensors, an aft shroud latches repair, installation of handrail covers, a new outer 
blanket layer, a new S-Band Single Access Transmitter, shell/shield replacement fabric, and 
voltage/temperature improvement kits for the batteries.  SM3A did not install any new scientific 
instruments.  The failure of a fourth gyroscope on November 19, 1999, a month before the SM3A launch, 
resulted in HST entering a safe mode.  Astronomical observations could not be performed while in safe 
mode.  Significant crew training resources were expended to develop and refine manual piloting techniques 
to approach and grapple HST in the HWSP and ZGSP safe mode configuration.  SM3A mission planning 
ensured that the deorbit and landing would occur in 1999 to avoid any potential year 2000 rollover 
computer issues. 
 
STS-103 Rendezvous and Proximity Operations 
 
The previous mission, STS-82, flew a stable orbit profile with a +R Bar final approach (Figures 6 and 11).  
However, the stable orbit profile baselined for the shuttle in April of 1983 was originally designed to 
support inertial approaches with lower energy than inertial approaches from the Apollo legacy coelliptic 
profile.10  While the  stable orbit/+R Bar combination was successfully flown on a number of missions, 
starting with STS-66 in November of 1994,  stable orbit was not a propellant optimal profile to support a 
+R Bar approach.  A new version of stable orbit rendezvous, Optimized R Bar Targeted (ORBT) 
rendezvous, was specifically designed to support the +R Bar technique (Figures 16 and 17).  ORBT 
required fewer jet firings for +R Bar trajectory stabilization and braking than stable orbit.  ORBT was first 
flown on the STS-86 mission to Mir in September-October 1997.   STS-103 was the first HST servicing 
mission to fly the ORBT/+R Bar combination.  The change from the stable orbit to the ORBT profile 
resulted in some differences in STS-82 and STS-103 +R Bar approach procedures.   
 
On the day of rendezvous, during the first star tracker pass, the Moon approached the star tracker line-of-
sight to the HST.  Anticipating that the bright Moon would cause an automatic closure of the star tracker 
shutter, flight controllers prepared for the event by providing the crew with times to inhibit star tracker 
measurements as the Moon passed through the star tracker field of view.  However, the star tracker Bright 
Object Sensor did not close the shutter in response to the Moon until the Moon was well inside the field of 
view.  In response the crew inhibited star tracker measurements for approximately seven and a half minutes 
during the first pass and for approximately eight minutes during the second pass (Figure 16).  Sufficient 
navigation data was collected during the two passes.  Some noise in the radar angle measurements was 
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noted after the MC4 burn.  This was normal and the noise seen on HST missions is much less than that 
observed on ISS missions.   
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Due to the fourth gyro failure on November 19, 1999, the HST Program chose to maintain attitude using 
the Hardware Sunpoint mode and back-up gyros (RMGA).  Fortunately, HST entered the Hardware 
Sunpoint mode with the V1 axis very close to the orbital plane.  The crew was able to confirm the 
Hardware Sunpoint attitude using binoculars about an hour before the grapple.  After a nominal +R bar 
approach the crew executed a 90 degree yaw maneuver on the +R Bar to achieve the grapple attitude.  HST 
was grappled with Discovery on the +V1 aperture door end of HST (Figure 1).  Propellant consumption 
during proximity operations was higher than expected.  Had the V1 axis not been close to the orbital plane, 
the grapple alignment maneuver would have been more complicated than a simple yaw and cost even more 
propellant.  Possible causes included noisy radar range rate measurements, and RCS jet cross coupling 
during the yaw maneuver.  In addition, the Sun was close to the orbital plane and above HST, complicating 
observation of HST and washing out displays in the shuttle cockpit.  Low Z braking starting at 1500 feet 
also increased propellant consumption. 
 
STS-103 Contingency Stable Orbit and Inertial Approach 
 
Starting with STS-103, the nominal rendezvous profile 
was ORBT, supporting a +R Bar approach (Figures 12, 
16, and 17).  However, should the aperture door fail to 
close before rendezvous, a +R Bar approach could 
expose the HST optics to RCS jet plume contamination.  
Like STS-82, in the event that the HST aperture door 
failed to close before rendezvous, the orbiter would 
perform an inertial approach.  However, this inertial 
approach would be flown from a stable orbit profile 
(Figures 6, 17, and 18), instead of the nominal ORBT 
profile (Figures 16, 17, and 18).  
 
With the proper timing, the failed open HST aperture 
door could be pointed away from the approaching 
orbiter throughout an inertial approach, to minimize 
risk of optics contamination.  Execution of a 
contingency stable orbit would have required re-
planning of the last ground targeted maneuver by Figure 18  Comparison of nominal and contingency 
approaches to HST for STS-103, STS-109, and STS-125.
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Mission Control (NC in Figures 6 and 16).  HST attitude would be managed so that the –V1 axis would be 
pointed at the orbiter at the MC4 + 2 minute point, where the crew took manual control and placed the 
orbiter in an inertial attitude hold (Figure 18).  At +V Bar arrival the –V1 axis would be pointed at the 
orbiter payload bay.  This combination of HST attitude and inertial approach ensured that the failed open 
aperture door would always be pointed away from the approaching orbiter during proximity operations, 
minimizing the risk of plume contamination of HST optics.  However, as the aperture door had closed at 
the time of the fourth gyro failure on November 19, there was no need to protect for this contingency.   
 
STS-103 Deploy 
 
STS-103 flew the same nominal deploy sequence options as STS-82.  Re-deployment of HST and 
separation by Discovery were nominal. 
 
STS-109 – SERVICING MISSION 3B (SM3B) 
 
Servicing mission SM3B (March 2002) placed new hardware on HST that was not ready in time to support 
the SM3A mission flown in December of 1999 (Table 1).  Maintenance activities included an Advanced 
Camera for Surveys to replace the Faint Object Camera, replacement of a power control unit, one of four 
reaction wheel assemblies, and a new cooling system for the Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object 
Spectrometer.  With the replacement of the Faint Object Camera, none of the optical sensors required the 
corrective optics installed in HST with COSTAR on STS-61 in December of 1993.  In addition, new solar 
arrays were installed that had more rigidity, produced more power, and were smaller than the arrays 
installed during STS-61. 
 
STS-109 Rendezvous and Proximity Operations 
 
The rate of orbital decay of HST resulted in a rendezvous altitude that was lower than the orbital insertion 
altitude.  To compensate, the normally posigrade catch-up maneuver (NC in Figure 16) before the first star 
tracker pass on the day of rendezvous was retrograde.   
 
The ORBT rendezvous profile for STS-109 was modified from two revolutions to Ti to one revolution to Ti 
(Figure 16), taking advantage of experience gained in numerous shortened rendezvous profiles flown on 
missions to the Mir space station and ISS.  This eliminated one star tracker pass that had mainly served as a 
backup relative navigation opportunity, but provided extra time in the crew day in the timeline after HST 
grapple.  Other aspects of the STS-109 ORBT profile was the same as STS-103.  STS-109 also carried the 
same +R Bar approach procedure as STS-103 (Figures 12, 13, 16, and 17). 
 
The +R Bar approach proceeded more slowly than in ground simulations.  This was consistent with 
previous missions and likely due to noisy range rate measurements and the difficulty of viewing HST 
against the Sun.  Welding goggles were used by the crew to view HST, but the goggles made it difficult to 
observe displays in the cockpit.  Proximity operations propellant consumption was higher than predicted, 
but within acceptable margins.  HST was successfully grappled. 
 
STS-109 Contingency Stable Orbit and Inertial Approach 
 
STS-109 carried the same Contingency Stable Orbit and Inertial Approach procedures as STS-103 (Figures 
17 and 18).  Unlike the stable orbit profile in Figure 6, the STS-109 stable orbit profile would have been 
one revolution between NC and Ti.  However, these procedures were not performed as the HST aperture 
door was successfully closed before rendezvous. 
 
STS-109 Deploy 
 
STS-109 flew the same nominal deploy procedures as STS-82 and STS-103 (Figures 14 and 15).  HST was 
successfully deployed. 
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STS-125 – SERVICING MISSION 4 (SM4) 
 
The primary objective of SM4, scheduled to be flown in 2009, is the installation of two new scientific 
instruments, the Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3) and the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS).  The 
COSTAR, installed during STS-61 to correct the spherical aberration of the primary mirror, will be 
removed to make room for the COS and returned to Earth.  New scientific instruments installed since STS-
61 in 1993 have corrective optics installed and COSTAR is no longer needed.  WFC2 will be removed 
from HST as well.  The Advanced Camera for Surveys partially failed in 2007 due to an electrical short and 
it will be repaired.  The Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph suffered a power failure in 2004 and will 
also be repaired.  In addition, all six gyroscopes and batteries will be replaced.  One of three Fine Guidance 
Sensors will be replaced and new Outer Blanket Layer insulation will be installed.  The crew will also 
replace the Science Instrument Control & Data Handling (SIC&DH) unit.  Side A of the HST Control 
Unit/Science Data Formatter within the SIC&DH failed on September 27, 2008.  Side B supported 
astronomy activities since the failure. 
 
SM4 will also mount a Low Impact Docking System (LIDS) passive interface on the Hubble aft bulkhead.  
LIDS was developed as the docking hardware for the Constellation Program.  LIDS will enable future 
human or robotic vehicles to dock with HST for servicing or HST deorbit.  The Hubble soft capture 
mechanism, including the LIDS passive interface, will be attached to the HST berthing pins that are used to 
berth Hubble to the Flight Support System (FSS) in the shuttle payload bay.  Four retro-reflectors will also 
be mounted on the assembly to support relative navigation sensors of future human or robotic vehicles.11  
The retro-reflectors are designed to work with the lidar sensors that were commercially available at the 
time of the Hubble Robotic Servicing and Deorbit Mission design effort.5  Painted patterns on the target 
assembly are designed to work with future optical recognition algorithms.  
 
STS-125 Propellant, Deorbit, and Landing Challenges 
 
The high HST orbital altitude increases the risk of a collision with orbital debris as the lower atmospheric 
density does not cause the debris to decay as rapidly as debris at lower orbital altitudes.  Increased concern 
about orbital debris at the HST orbital altitude led the Shuttle Program to reduce the amount of time the 
orbiter is at that altitude between HST deployment and the deorbit burn.  In addition, it is necessary that 
any maneuvers performed by the orbiter after HST deploy to contribute to deorbit.   Placing the orbiter in 
an elliptical orbit before the deorbit burn limits the landing opportunities since deorbit burns near perigee 
are far more costly in propellant.  This is true even for landing sites that are within the orbiter’s entry cross-
range capability.  The post deorbit burn perigee has to be placed at an appropriate latitude for a landing at 
the Kennedy Space Center or Edwards Air Force Base. 
 
STS-125 Nominal and Contingency Procedures for Rendezvous, Proximity Operations, and Deploy 
 
STS-125 will carry the same ORBT rendezvous profile and +R Bar approach procedures as STS-109 
(Figures 12, 13, 16, and 17).  In the event that the HST aperture door fails to close before final approach, 
STS-125 will perform the same contingency stable orbit and inertial approach that was prepared for STS-
103 and STS-109.  The nominal STS-125 deploy sequence is the same as that flown on STS-82, STS-103, 
and STS-109 (Figures 14 and 15). 
 
OTHER CONTINGENCY RENDEZVOUS PROCEDURES 
 
There are three contingency rendezvous procedures that have been flown on all HST missions (Table 2).  
These are Ti Delay, Radar Fail, and Breakout. 
 
Ti Delay permits the orbiter to fly a relative motion football (Figures 6 and 16) at the 8 nm Ti point.  This 
delay could provide the crew, Mission Control, and the HST STOCC at the Goddard Space Flight Center 
with time to resolve a problem before proceeding with the rendezvous.  Alternatively, if the problem could 
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not be resolved in time to permit the rendezvous and grapple on that crew day, the orbiter could separate 
and phase away from the HST overnight.  Ti Delay has not been performed on a HST mission.  The only Ti 
Delay flown by the shuttle was on STS-49 (May 1992), in response to a Lambert maneuver targeting 
anomaly.10,12  
 
The Radar Fail procedure would be used by the crew after the Mid-course Correction (MC2) maneuver, if 
radar data were not available for relative navigation and proximity operations (Figures 6, 16, and 17).  A 
radar failure has not occurred on HST missions.  However, the rendezvous radar did fail before the STS-92 
rendezvous with the ISS in October of 2000.  The Radar Fail contingency procedure was successfully 
executed on that mission.10  
 
If a shuttle or HST problem prevented the rendezvous and grapple from being completed, the Breakout 
procedure would enable the orbiter to establish a safe relative motion trajectory that would not come close 
to the HST.  A breakout during the rendezvous phase (Figures 6 and 16) has not been performed on an HST 
servicing mission, or on any other the shuttle mission. 
 
OTHER CONTINGENCY PROXIMITY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES 
 
Like nominal proximity operations procedures, the contingency procedures are heavily influenced by HST 
and shuttle hardware design.  Contingency proximity operations procedures have evolved, but the number 
of procedures stabilized by the third servicing mission, STS-103 (Table 2).   
 
Some contingency procedures are designed to enable the orbiter to safely leave the vicinity of the HST if a 
problem prevents grapple.  The orbiter may station-keep in the vicinity of the HST while Mission Control, 
the STOCC, and the crew work to resolve the problem.  If the problem cannot be resolved in a timely 
manner, a breakout is performed so the orbiter safely leaves the vicinity of the HST.  Prox Ops Backoff 
allows the orbiter to back away from HST to a safe station-keeping distance.  The HST +R Bar Breakout 
(Table 2) was designed for execution starting at a range of 500 feet until the crew initiates the final inertial 
grapple (Figure 12).  A backout along the +R Bar may be required to at least 75 feet before the orbiter can 
leave the +R Bar via a breakout to avoid undesirable contact with HST.  Prox Ops Breakout permits the 
orbiter to safely leave the vicinity of the HST and exit the proximity operations phase.   
 
The EVA Rescue procedure is used to retrieve an EVA crew member that is no longer tethered to the 
orbiter or EVA tools that are no longer tethered to the crew member.  It is desirable for any EVA tools that 
are lost overboard to be retrieved as they present a collision hazard.  The procedures ensure that structural 
loads imparted by translational RCS jet activity will not cause failure of the connection between the HST 
and Flight Support Structure (FSS) in the shuttle payload bay.   
 
Some contingency procedures permit grapple to be accomplished or a breakout to be performed in the 
event of vernier or Low Z RCS jet failures.  The Loss of Vernier RCS procedure permits proximity 
operations to continue if the orbiter 25 pound thrust vernier RCS jets are no longer available for fine 
attitude control.  The Loss of Low Z Braking procedure provides options to use for any loss of or 
degradation of Low Z capability during the approach.  The approach could be continued or a Loss of Low 
Z breakout performed.  The HST Flyaround/Loss of Low Z Breakout is performed between initiation of 
inertial attitude hold by the crew and grapple.  By the time of STS-103, the number of breakout scenarios 
had grown enough that a new flow chart was implemented on a cue card to help the crew navigate through 
the many options.   
 
Other contingency proximity operations procedures listed in Table 2 are performed if HST is not in the 
correct attitude for grapple when the shuttle arrives.  These include the STS Roll to Align, Manual Inertial 
Fly-around, Auto Inertial Fly-Around, yaw/pitch/yaw fly-around, and the R Bar Yaw Alignment. 
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CONTINGENCY DEPLOY 
 
Contingency deploy procedures have also been carried on all HST missions (Table 2).  These procedures 
permit HST deployment if the RMS is not available or if a faster than normal deployment must be 
accomplished in response to a systems performance anomaly.  These anomalies could require the orbiter to 
perform an emergency deorbit or a perigee adjust. 
 
Contingency procedures were developed to cover partial or complete failures of the RMS (Table 2).  For a 
total RMS failure a backaway deployment would have been performed.  This procedure has been prepared 
for all HST missions.  The procedure for the STS-31 deploy mission involved releasing HST retaining 
latches in the payload bay and performing a +Z translation burn (Figure 2) by the orbiter to slowly back 
away from the HST.  The procedure for all subsequent flights was designed to allow the HST berthing pins 
to clear the FSS latches, while avoiding attitude jet firings that could cause the pins to re-contact.  The 
deploy attitude avoids shadowing of the HST solar arrays by orbiter structure.   
 
All HST missions been equipped with an Emergency RMS Deploy (STS-31) or a RMS Quick Deploy 
(STS-61, STS-82, STS-103, STS-109, and STS-125).  The RMS Quick Deploy could be performed if a 
faster than normal release of HST is required in response to an orbiter systems problem.  The quick deploy 
has essentially the same sequence as the nominal deploy, but certain non-mandatory HST crew 
commanding and orbiter relative navigation procedures are omitted to save time. 
 
JETTISON 
 
Jettison procedures are carried to permit the release of payload bay hardware from the orbiter if it cannot be 
secured in the payload bay or it is stuck in an unsafe configuration (Table 2).  Jettison procedures are 
designed to permit the orbiter to safely leave the jettisoned hardware while minimizing risk of re-contact.  
Some jettison procedures can be executed by the crew from the cockpit, while other procedures may 
require crew action during EVA.  Jettison procedures are not considered nominal, are often payload and 
payload support hardware specific, and will vary from flight to flight.  Jettison procedures for servicing 
hardware include the Orbiter Replacement Unit Carrier (ORUC), Rigid Array Carrier (RAC), Solar Array 
Carrier (SAC), and the Super Lightweight Interchangeable Carrier (SLIC).  These procedures require that 
HST be jettisoned first.  The ORUC, SAC, and SLIC jettison procedures require action by EVA crew 
members.   
 
A HST Jettison would be performed if the orbiter were required to perform a time critical de-orbit in 
response to problems such as loss of crew cabin pressure or a propellant leak.  The jettison procedure can 
be performed in any attitude.  Low Z RCS jet firings are used to back the orbiter away from HST after the 
FSS latches are opened.   
 
The orbiter payload bay doors must be closed for the orbiter to safely return to Earth.  If the RMS or the 
rendezvous radar cannot be stowed for entry, then they would be jettisoned to enable the payload doors to 
be closed.   A generic hardware jettison procedure is available on all flights if the crew has to jettison 
generic hardware, including EVA hardware. 
 
A solar array jettison procedure was developed for STS-61 and STS-109 in case an array could not be fully 
retracted and stowed for return to Earth.  The power generation side of the array must face away from the 
Sun when the array electrical lines between HST and the array are disconnected by the EVA crew.  The 
array would be released by an EVA crew member mounted on the RMS with a foot restraint, using either a 
jettison handle or a portable grapple fixture.  One solar array was jettisoned on STS-61.  This is the only 
jettison that has been performed on a HST servicing mission. 
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ATLANTIS RESCUE 
 
Since the loss of Columbia in 2003, each shuttle mission has performed inspection of the Thermal 
Protection System (TPS) to determine if the TPS sustained damage during ascent from External Tank foam 
shedding.  The primary means of inspection is the Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) that is mounted on 
the end of the RMS.  On ISS missions, a R Bar Pitch Maneuver (RPM) is performed ~600 foot below the 
ISS to permit ISS crew to photograph the orbiter TPS.  Photographs provide an additional source of data on 
TPS integrity.  If TPS damage is detected and is considered to be a safety risk and cannot be repaired on-
orbit during an EVA, plans were developed to permit a Space Shuttle crew to use the ISS as a safe haven.  
The next Space Shuttle in the launch preparation flow for an ISS mission would be launched to retrieve the 
crew from the ISS and return them to Earth.   
 
Like ISS missions, the STS-125 crew will perform a TPS inspection using the OBSS.  However, the STS-
125 Atlantis crew could not use the ISS as a safe haven in the event the Atlantis TPS was compromised, as 
the shuttle does not have sufficient propellant to reach the ISS from the HST orbit.  To provide a rescue 
capability, a Launch On Need (LON) Atlantis rescue mission was prepared (Table 1).  A rescue shuttle 
flown by the four flight deck crew members from the STS-123 (March 2008) mission to the ISS would fly 
the rescue mission, if it were required.  The rescue concept requires the pre-launch parallel processing of 
both Atlantis and the rescue orbiter at the Kennedy Space Center.  The rescue Space Shuttle would be on 
one of the Complex 39 launch pads while Atlantis was launched from the other pad.  This would be a first 
for the Shuttle Program.  Although maximum crew awake time is limited to 18 hours to avoid fatigue, this 
limit could have been waved in a rescue scenario to ensure the safe retrieval and return of the Atlantis crew. 
 
Atlantis Rescue Rendezvous Design 
 
The nominal rendezvous mission plan for the rescue was a flight day 2 grapple of Atlantis by the rescue 
orbiter, with the possibility of a flight day 3 or 4 grapple, if permitted by ample propellant margins.  A 
flight day 2 grapple is preferred so that the rescue orbiter could reach Atlantis as quickly as possible and 
provide maximum on-orbit time for the crew transfer to be completed.  This is the first nominally planned 
flight day 2 rendezvous and grapple in the Shuttle Program and would be the first rendezvous of one shuttle 
with another.  Ground-up shuttle rendezvous missions to the ISS normally conduct docking/grapple on 
flight day 3, with a flight day 2 or flight day 4 docking/grapple as a possible contingency.  Rendezvous 
trajectory dispersions are expected to be higher than normal due to the limited amount of time to track out 
dispersions on flight day 1 in support of rendezvous orbital adjustment burns.  The crew rendezvous 
checklists for both the STS-125 and the rescue mission have been combined into one document. 
 
The ORBT rendezvous on flight day 2 (the star tracker pass through the MC4 burn) is similar to that of ISS 
and HST servicing missions (Figure 17 and the one revolution to Ti profile in Figure 16).  For all shuttle 
rendezvous missions, in the event of a rendezvous radar failure, a correction burn is performed after the 
third mid-course correction burn.  If Atlantis has sufficient propellant and power, contingency night star 
tracker measurements could be obtained by the rescue orbiter if the payload bay lights of Atlantis were 
turned on and the payload bay pointed in the direction of the approaching rescue orbiter.  However, if 
Atlantis is not able to perform the procedure, the rendezvous profile timing was adjusted pre-mission to 
insure Atlantis would be lit by the sun to support crew procedures for the radar fail correction burn.  
 
Atlantis Rescue Contingency Rendezvous Procedures 
 
In the nominal rendezvous plan the rescue orbiter performs all maneuvering.  Contingency rendezvous 
recovery plans were also developed in case the rescue orbiter could not execute the nominal rendezvous 
profile due to an ascent under-speed at MECO or a propellant failure.  The rendezvous recovery profile 
would preserve the flight day 2 grapple, if possible.  While it is preferred to fly a rendezvous with the 
rescue orbiter approaching from behind and below, off-nominal cases could require a rendezvous with the 
rescue orbiter ahead and above Atlantis for much of the rendezvous.  In these contingency cases Atlantis 
might also be required to perform orbit adjustments of relative altitude and phasing enable the rescue 
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orbiter to complete the rendezvous.  Propellant margins on both vehicles would have been carefully 
managed to ensure that the rescue orbiter had sufficient propellant for a safe deorbit.   
 
This technique is known as control box rendezvous, and was performed on STS-49 (INTELSAT VI/F-3 
rendezvous, May 1992) and STS-72 (Space Flyer Unit rendezvous, January 1996).  The target spacecraft 
executes a series of maneuvers after the chaser spacecraft is launched.  The maneuvers are designed so that 
the target enters a volume in space, called a control box, at a designated time. This technique reduces 
chaser vehicle (in this case, the rescue orbiter) propellant consumption. Once the target enters the box, it no 
longer maneuvered.  Rendezvous recovery would be planned so that Atlantis would not perform orbit 
adjustments on the day of rendezvous.    
 
The final rendezvous orbit for the rendezvous recovery case impacts landing opportunities for the rescue 
orbiter.  The final orbit must preserve at least one continental United States landing opportunity for the 
rescue shuttle per day, with two opportunities preferred.  If required, a landing could also have been 
performed at sites outside the continental United States.  In addition, achievement of acceptable disposal 
areas for Atlantis would also be factored into rendezvous recovery planning and determination of the final 
rendezvous orbit.  However, protecting the rescue orbiter deorbit propellant margins has a higher priority 
than Atlantis propellant margins for achieving a safe Atlantis disposal footprint.   
 
For the on-board targeted phase on the day of rendezvous, the rescue orbiter will fly three contingency 
rendezvous procedures flown by other HST servicing and ISS missions.  These were Radar Fail, 
Rendezvous Breakout, and Ti Delay (Table 2). 
 
Atlantis Rescue Nominal Proximity Operations 
 
Atlantis will maneuver to the grapple attitude just before the 
rescue orbiter executes the MC4 burn (Figure 16).   The grapple 
attitude places the nose of Atlantis out-of-plane toward orbital 
south and the payload bay pointed at the Earth (Figure 19).  The 
flight control system would maintain this attitude using the 25 
pound thrust vernier RCS jets.  
 
The proximity operations profile (starting at manual crew take-
over after MC4) is a +R Bar approach.  However, unlike ISS 
missions, the R Bar Pitch Maneuver (RPM) would not be 
performed.13  The rescue orbiter flight control system would be 
placed in the Low Z mode from a range of 1000 feet through 
grapple.  This range was chosen since the crews from ISS 
missions are familiar with Low Z operation starting at this 
range.  Atlantis and the rescue orbiter would be at 90 degree 
angles to each other (Atlantis nose toward orbital south, the 
rescue orbiter nose pointed along the velocity vector) to 
minimize plume impingement effects during the Low Z +R bar 
approach by the rescue orbiter (Figure 19).  The rescue orbiter 
would carry both Trajectory Control Sensor (TCS) and Hand 
Held Lidar (HHL) for use during proximity operations. 
 
Capture would be performed with the RMS of the rescue orbiter grappling the forward grapple fixture on 
Atlantis' berthed Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS).  After grapple the OBSS would roll out and the 
RMS of the rescue orbiter would be used to maneuver Atlantis so that both orbiters were nose-to-nose for 
effective mated attitude control.  The rescue orbiter would then maneuver the mated stack to a gravity 
gradient attitude.  The RMS of Atlantis is not used. 
 
Figure 19  Rescue orbiter approach 
to Atlantis.
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Atlantis Rescue Contingency Proximity Operations Procedures 
 
Three contingency proximity operations procedures have been prepared for the rescue mission (Table 2).  
These procedures, Prox Ops Backoff, HST R Bar Breakout, and Loss of Vernier RCS are the same as those 
flown on HST servicing missions. 
 
EVA Crew Transfer, Separation, and Deorbit 
 
The rescue involves the transfer by EVA of the seven member Atlantis crew to the rescue orbiter on flight 
days 3 and 4.  A total of three EVA transfers from Atlantis to the rescue orbiter would be performed using 
the white Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) suits.  Only Atlantis crew members would participate in the 
EVAs.  The four members of the rescue orbiter crew (Table 1) would remain inside the rescue orbiter.  At 
the start of the first EVA participating crew members would install a translation rope along the RMS of the 
rescue orbiter.  Astronauts McArthur and Feustel, along with all seven of the orange launch/entry suits, 
would transfer to the rescue orbiter during the first EVA.  Johnson and 
Grunsfeld would transfer during the second EVA, along with all of the 
thermal protection system repair hardware.   
 
The third and final EVA would transfer Altman, Massimino, and Good.  
Before the last EVA, the remaining crew members on Atlantis would 
configure the cockpit for the separation and ground commanded deorbit 
burn.  Atlantis disposal procedures are based on those developed for 
damaged orbiter disposal on ISS missions.14  This includes opening 
allowable attitude error and rate limits so that automatic flight control 
firings of the RCS jets would not be performed with the rescue orbiter 
in close proximity to Atlantis.  Atlantis would be released by the rescue 
orbiter on flight day 4 (Figure 20).  TPS inspection using the OBSS 
would be performed on flight day 5, and flight days 6 and 7 would be 
used for entry preparation.  Rescue orbiter entry and landing is planned 
for flight day 8.  
 
OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
 
HST missions succeeded in part due to the efforts of personnel from multiple disciplines that had extensive 
experience planning and flying servicing missions to a variety of spacecraft.  This facilitated application of 
best practices and lessons learned.3-8  These personnel are experienced at working in a multi-disciple 
environment involving multiple NASA organizations and supporting contractors that requires lateral 
communication.  Shuttle Program personnel are experienced in development of contingency procedures, 
both pre-mission and during a flight, and with interacting with development and operations personnel 
representing a variety of target spacecraft.   
 
A flight program must be responsive to unanticipated satellite performance issues that may drive late and 
significant changes in servicing mission plans.  These events can drive changes to existing proximity 
operations, robotic operation, and servicing procedures, or require the creation of new procedures and 
mission plans.  The availability of additional qualified personnel to develop new procedures and 
operational work-arounds enables a flight program to effectively respond to off-nominal events during real-
time operations. 
 
Development and operations personnel continually learn about vehicle systems performance and limitations 
even after a spacecraft has been built and is in orbit.  Unforeseen constraints and performance limitations 
will emerge that drive development of new or changes to existing nominal and contingency plans and 
procedures.  Over the life of a flight program improvements in analysis and simulation fidelity may reveal 
additional operational constraints.   An example of this was the gradual discovery of HST sensitivity to 
Figure 20  Rescue orbiter 
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plume impingement that resulted in the increasing range of Low Z mode initiation from 200 feet out to 
1500 feet. 
 
Servicing mission personnel should consider applying rendezvous, proximity operations, and other 
techniques from other spaceflight missions and flight programs to mitigate risk to mission success.  High 
value missions may drive significant investment in low-probability of occurrence contingency procedures 
to ensure mission success in the presence of failures and degraded systems performance.  However, this 
may result in an increase in the number of procedures that program personnel must maintain and be 
prepared to execute over the life of a flight program. 
 
Many nominal and contingency HST procedures were driven by RCS plume impingement overpressure and 
contamination concerns.  Consideration should be given to building spacecraft structures and systems that 
are not as sensitive to servicing vehicle characteristics such as RCS jet plumes.  Furthermore, servicing 
spacecraft should be designed with RCS and other systems that do not pose a potential hazard to satellites 
that could be serviced.  
 
The highly reflective surface of HST makes it a poor target for the HHL and causes shuttle payload bay 
camera blooming, complicating proximity operations piloting.  Experience has shown that the RMS grapple 
fixtures on HST are good targets for the HHL.  Proximity operations contingency procedure development 
for the ZGSP and HWSP HST attitude control safe modes was complicated by a lack of HST retro-
reflectors to support the shuttle TCS and HHL.   In addition, Mission Control and crew insight into HST 
attitude during these safe modes was limited, and based primary on crew observations.  Comprehensive 
telemetry, sensor aids on the vehicle to be serviced, and relative sensors capable of performing relative 
attitude determination can simplify proximity operations piloting.   
 
In spite of the previously mentioned challenges, ground personnel (HST STOCC, Space Shuttle Mission 
Control) and shuttle crew members possessed the flexibility, creativity, and situational awareness to 
analyze unforeseen issues and develop new procedures in a timely manner.  Spacecraft and ground support 
organizations in future robotic or human flight programs should be flexible enough to accommodate late 
changes in mission requirements.  Such responsiveness significantly enhances the probability of mission 
success.   
 
SUMMARY 
 
Then Space Shuttle Program has successfully flown servicing missions that have repaired and upgraded the 
Hubble Space Telescope.  These repair missions increased the science return and extended the life of the 
telescope by correcting performance problems, replacing malfunctioning hardware, and equipping it with 
more advanced astronomy sensors.  Conducting these missions required the development, adaption, and 
evolution of numerous crew procedures and flight techniques for performing rendezvous, proximity 
operations, and deployment.  Nominal and contingency procedure development required the efforts of both 
Shuttle and HST program personnel in disciplines including trajectory design, robotics, flight control, 
thermal control, power generation, structures, orbital debris, and Extra-Vehicular Activity.  Space Shuttle 
and HST hardware design and limitations placed requirements and constraints on these nominal and 
contingency techniques.  Some constraints were known early in the development of mission techniques in 
the 1980s, others emerged after HST was placed in orbit in 1990.  Particular care was taken to “do no 
harm” to HST and not impede the ability of HST to perform the science mission. The HST servicing 
experience and lessons learned are applicable to other programs that perform on-orbit servicing and 
rendezvous, both human and robotic. 
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approaches.
ORBT reduces propellant required to 
establish a +R Bar approach.
Flown on STS-103, 109, and planned 
for 125.
Approach and grapple procedures
inside 600 feet are the same as
STS-82.
Stable orbit and inertial approach 
retained as a backup for the HST 
failed open aperture door case.
+ V Bar (feet)
MC3
MC4
MC4
-2000 -4000
+4000
+2000
+ R Bar (feet)
ORBT
•
•
•
•
Stable 
Orbit
+R Bar Approach,
Less Braking
Inertial 
Approach,
More 
Braking
Deploys
HST placed on-orbit during STS-31.
Deploy attitude optimized for solar 
array power generation.
Simple two-burn posigrade in-plane 
separation
Sep1 Low Z burn very expensive in 
terms of propellant.
Contingency rendezvous if aperture 
door failed closed.
°°
HST deploy.
Sep1 burn.
Sep2 burn.
-400+400
-400
+ V Bar 
(feet)
+R Bar (feet)
•
Overnight
Separation
Long Range 
Station-Keeping
-10 -20 -30
+2
+4 +R Bar (nm)
+V Bar 
(nm)
Coelliptic
Departure 
-40
Deploy
New deploy attitude for STS-61 and subsequent 
flights.
Original three-burn separation 
provided long deploy window.
During STS-61 Mission Control 
changed separation to a 2-burn 
sequence with a shorter deploy 
window to save propellant.
Sep1 Low Z separation burn 
propellant-expensive.
Deploy+V Bar (feet)
+R Bar 
(feet)
Original
Plan
Mission 
Control 
Plan
+2000
+2000+4000 •
•
•
•
•
Sep1Sep2
Sep3
New HST requirement to avoid pointing aperture near Earth 
limb caused major change to deploy sequence.
Avoid exposing HST optics to UV.
Initial burn is –X translation inspired 
by upper stage deploy techniques 
such as IUS/TDRS. 
New separation reduced propellant 
consumption.
Used for STS-82 and subsequent 
missions.
Sun north of the 
orbital plane.
Sun south of the 
orbital plane.
-1000
-500+500
•
•
Deploy
Sep1
Sep2 burn
+R Bar 
(feet)
+V Bar 
(feet)
•
•
+R Bar 
(feet)
+V Bar 
(feet)
Deploy
Sep1
Sep2
+1000
-1000
Contingency Procedures
Contingency procedures have increased from 
12 for STS-31 to 21 for STS-125.
Contingency procedures cover:
Rendezvous – Little variation since STS-31.
Proximity Operations – Most permit grapple 
of HST in an off-nominal attitude, or allow the 
Shuttle to safely leave HST in the event of 
RCS jet failures.
Jettison – Some procedures specific to 
servicing hardware carried in payload bay.
Deploy/Separation – For RMS fail or an 
expedited deploy.
Operational Experiences
STS-82 – Star tracker lost target, but 
re-acquired.
STS-82 – Sep2 underburn, additional 
burn added in real-time.
STS-103 – Moon in star tracker field of 
view, procedural work-around avoided 
impact to navigation.
STS-103 – HST gyro failures led to use 
of Hardware Sunpoint mode.  Crew 
performed 90 degree yaw maneuver 
to align Shuttle for grapple.
Rescue Flight
For 28.5 degree inclination flight ISS is 
not available as a safe haven.
Another Shuttle will be prepared for 
launch in parallel with Atlantis for
a rescue mission.
+R Bar approach using ISS procedures, 
but without the R Bar Pitch Maneuver.
90 degree clocking at grapple to avoid
plume effects.
Atlantis crew transfer to rescue Shuttle
over three EVAs.
+50
+R Bar (feet)
+V Bar 
(feet)
+200
Rescue 
Orbiter
Atlantis
+100
+250
Observations on 
Servicing
Be responsive to unanticipated 
performance issues that may 
drive late changes to servicing 
plans. 
Development and operations 
personnel continually learn about 
vehicle systems performance 
and limitations.
Servicing spacecraft should be 
designed with RCS and other 
systems that do not pose a 
potential hazard to satellites
that could be serviced.
Questions
